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Abstract 
We demonstrate that banks play an important monitoring role in CEO succession that is not 
observed for other types of lenders, particularly public bondholders.  There is a stronger relation 
between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt during the 
year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt, and bank debt issuance increases the 
likelihood of external CEO succession.  The stock price reaction to CEO succession is higher 
when bank monitoring is prevalent.  Our results are consistent with theories of relationship 
banking that propose a valuable monitoring role for well informed, incentivized bank lenders.   
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1. Introduction 
The unique role that bank lending plays in corporate financing has been developed in a 
number of theoretical studies.  Firms borrowing from banks are expected to benefit from close 
monitoring by bank lenders, whose relationship with the firm allows them to access non-public 
data unavailable to arms-length lenders (see Diamond, 1984; Rajan, 1992; Nakamura, 1993).  
This superior monitoring incentive and ability has led some to describe bank financing as special 
relative to borrowing in public debt markets.   
Diamond (1984, 1991) and Rajan (1992) argue that bank lenders are comparatively 
superior monitors to public bondholders.  Banks are also able to observe the repayment history of 
existing loans and monitor the firm’s cash flow position through provision of transaction 
accounts (Nakamura, 1993).  These arguments are predicated on the basis that one or a small 
number of private lenders are less likely to suffer the free-rider problems in monitoring loans that 
public bondholders, with dispersed financial claims, experience.  These advantages provide 
banks with a unique ability to monitor existing loans and screen new lending decisions.   
Evidence of the special nature of bank monitoring is derived from event studies of the 
market reaction to bank loan announcements relative to public bond issuance or by analyzing the 
role of banks in providing finance to firms screened out of public debt markets.  However, Ahn 
and Choi (2009) note very few studies provide direct evidence that banks influence corporate 
decision making or the value effects of such decisions.  This is despite frequent news coverage of 
bank involvement in corporate investment and restructuring decisions. 
We examine the special monitoring role of banks by examining the relation between forced 
chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance, and the likelihood of external 
CEO succession across alternative sources of firm borrowing.  In doing so we suggest that an 
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important function of monitoring is the appointment and replacement of top management and 
effective monitors will replace poorly performing top managers (see Denis and Denis, 1995; 
Parrino, 1997).  Gilson (1990) argues that creditor monitoring can substitute for ineffective board 
governance in financially distressed firms.  Franks et al. (2001) note that creditors have greater 
ability to monitor and replace incumbent management in exchange for new loans or the 
restructuring of existing loans.  If banks are superior monitors relative to dispersed public 
bondholders we expect to observe a stronger relation between firm performance and the 
probability of forced CEO turnover and a greater likelihood of external CEO succession for firms 
that borrow from banks.  We also expect that if banks are superior monitors then stockholders 
will benefit from higher quality bank initiated CEO turnover events, as measured by the stock 
price response to CEO departure announcements.  CEO succession decisions provide a natural 
setting to study monitoring because such decisions have highly visible outcomes and are 
associated with significant changes in operating and financing policies (see Weisbach, 1988; 
Gilson, 1989).   
Two firms in our sample highlight this potential.  The CEO of MFI Furniture Group John 
Hancock left his firm in October 2005 at a time when the firm was reaching the limits of its 
borrowing facility and was close to breaching loan covenants.  Similarly, Kevin Hyde lost his job 
as CEO of Jarvis reportedly at the behest of the firm’s banks.  In each case their replacements 
agreed to undertake major asset disposals as part of wider restructuring programmes, and were 
able to convince lending banks to renegotiate existing loans and raise new bank debt.  Press 
coverage of these events suggests a prominent monitoring role for banks in CEO replacement 
decisions when borrowing firms need to renegotiate or extend loan facilities. 
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Our sample covers non-financial firms in the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) from 2000 to 2008 and our hand-collected data on existing and new borrowing 
sources allows us to distinguish across different providers of debt finance.  We focus on large 
firms who are more likely to have access to public debt markets and on cash flow measures of 
firm performance that are likely to be of greatest interest to lenders since they reflect the ability 
of firms to meet interest and principal repayment on debt (see Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). 
Prior evidence of bank and private lender monitoring in top management replacement has 
primarily focused on financially distressed firms.  Gilson (1989, 1990) finds that a significant 
fraction of top management changes in distressed firms are initiated by bank lenders.  Following 
bank initiated top management changes incumbent management is more likely to be replaced by 
externally hired successors including turnaround specialists and in a small number of cases by 
direct representatives of lending banks.  Finally, top management turnover is unrelated to public 
bondholder initiatives.  Ofek (1993) finds that the probability of top management turnover 
following a large stock price decline is inversely related to the ratio of public to total debt and 
concludes that management change is an outcome of active monitoring by private lenders.   
Our findings both compliment and extend this work.  We show that bank monitoring can 
play a crucial role in managerial discipline outside of financial distress and this effect is driven 
by new debt issuance.  We find a stronger relation between forced CEO turnover and cash flow 
performance for companies issuing bank debt during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not 
issuing bank debt.  However, we find no difference in the relation between forced CEO turnover 
and firm performance based on existing bank debt or the presence of a bank affiliated director on 
the borrower firm’s board.  These findings contribute to literature on the special nature of bank 
monitoring by showing that banks are active monitors of poorly performing CEOs for a more 
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general sample of firms than studied by Gilson (1989, 1990) and Ofek (1993).  Our findings also 
highlight that the strength of bank monitoring of poorly performing managers is conditional on 
firms raising bank debt, while CEO succession decisions are unrelated to existing banking 
relationships. 
We also find that the likelihood of external CEO succession is increasing with bank debt 
issuance.  External succession is unrelated to public debt issuance, bank affiliations on the firm’s 
board of directors, or to source of existing borrowings.  To the extent that external succession is 
correlated with a departure from existing strategy and a greater likelihood of value-added 
corporate restructuring (see Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson et al., 2001), our findings further 
highlight an important role for bank monitoring in CEO succession decisions when there is an 
increased need to restructure the firm’s operations.  Granting of new loans and renegotiation of 
existing bank facilities increases the likelihood of appointing a successor CEO who is more 
likely to significantly restructure operations. 
Finally, we find that the stock price response to forced CEO turnover is significantly higher 
when firms borrow from banks during the year of turnover, but is again unrelated to public debt 
issuance, existing debt source, and the presence of a banking relationship on the firm’s board of 
directors.  Our findings contribute to research on the benefits of bank monitoring to show that 
one of the direct benefits of bank monitoring is an increase in the expected quality of CEO 
succession decisions.  This extends prior research on the market reaction to CEO succession 
announcements to highlight the importance of external monitoring, in this case from lending 
banks, in the quality of managerial succession decisions. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses prior literature on 
the special nature of bank monitoring and develops our hypotheses relating to its potential role in 
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CEO succession.  Section 3 outlines our sample and data collection for CEO succession and 
sources of corporate borrowing.  Section 4 presents our empirical findings and evaluates our 
results, and Section 5 concludes.    
 
2. Bank monitoring and CEO succession 
2.1. Evidence on the special nature of bank monitoring 
Empirical evidence on the role of bank monitoring has generally sought to address one of 
three research issues.  Firstly, event studies of the market response to announcements of bank 
loans find a positive reaction (see Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; James, 1987).  This contrasts 
with the insignificant or negative market reaction to announcements of public bond issues and 
seasoned equity offers, and the difference is attributed to the superior monitoring ability of bank 
lenders (see Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Hadlock and James, 2002).   
A second set of studies draws conclusions on monitoring efficiency by studying the type of 
firms that borrow from banks.  Johnson (1997) and Hadlock and James (2002) find that banks 
are more likely to provide credit to small, high growth firms, with higher stock price volatility.  
They conclude that such firms are subject to higher information asymmetries and overinvestment 
concerns, and are more likely to benefit from bank monitoring.  Denis and Mihov (2003) also 
find an important role for banks in provision of debt finance to firms with weaker credit ratings.   
A third strand of research provides more direct evidence that banks monitor borrowing 
firms by analyzing the relationship between bank debt, corporate decision making, and the 
market reaction to such decisions.  Hirschey et al. (1990) and Datta et al. (2003) find that the 
market reaction to asset sell-offs is increasing with bank and private debt respectively, relative to 
public debt.  Low et al. (2001) find that the market reaction to dividend cuts is positively related 
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to bank debt, and significantly so for small firms who are likely to be subject to greater levels of 
information asymmetry.  Datta et al. (1999) report a negative relation between the at-issue yield 
spread on a firm’s first public bond offer and both the presence and strength of a firm’s banking 
relationship.
1
  Ang et al. (2000) show that the agency costs of private firms monitored by banks 
are lower and conclude that bank monitoring adds value.  Finally, Ahn and Choi (2009) find that 
borrowing firm’s earnings management activities are negatively correlated with the strength of 
bank monitoring. 
 
2.2. Firm performance, monitoring and CEO succession 
The finding of a negative relation between firm performance and the likelihood of forced 
CEO turnover is well documented, robust to a number of accounting, stock price and financial 
distress measures, and has been established for the US (see Weisbach, 1988), Italy (see Brunello 
et al., 2003), and the UK (see Conyon and Florou, 2002).  Poor performance is also associated 
with a higher incidence of external CEO succession (see Huson et al., 2001; Dahya and 
McConnell, 2005). 
In explaining the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance and the likelihood 
of external succession, important roles have been found for board structure (see Weisbach, 1988; 
Dahya et al., 2002; Dahya and McConnell, 2005) and large external stockholders (see Denis et 
al., 1997).  Easterbrook (1984) proposes that external capital markets exert discipline on firms 
when they seek to raise equity capital.  The need to raise equity puts firms in a weak bargaining 
position and allows buyers of new capital greater control over management.  Franks et al. (2001) 
and Hillier et al. (2005) find that disciplinary turnover of the board and CEO is more frequent at 
                                                 
1
 The at-issue yield spread is defined as the difference in basis points between the at-issue yield for the initial public 
debt offer and the yield of a Treasury bond with similar maturity and coupon on the same day. 
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poorly performing firms who need to raise external equity capital.  Hillier et al. (2005) also find 
that external CEO succession is increasing in likelihood when firms raise equity. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses development 
Our prior discussion highlights that banks are expected to be superior monitors of borrower 
firms and influence both the likelihood and value of corporate decisions.  Whether bank lenders 
specifically consider CEO succession for monitoring is the empirical question examined in this 
paper. 
We formulate three tests that relate bank monitoring to CEO replacement decisions: the 
relation between forced CEO turnover and firm performance, the likelihood of an external CEO 
successor being appointed, and the stock price reaction to CEO succession announcements. 
 
2.3.1. Relation between forced CEO turnover and cash flow performance 
For UK firms, Franks et al. (2001) argue that pre-emption requirements for large equity 
offers provide significant power to existing equity investors who can cause the failure of a 
distressed rights offer.
2
  We propose that bank lenders are able to fulfil a similar monitoring role.  
When poorly performing or financially distressed firms seek to renew existing loans or raise new 
debt, bank lenders have both the financial incentive and bargaining power to demand changes in 
investment and financing policies at borrower firms, including replacement of top management.   
In his descriptive analysis of US firms experiencing a prolonged period of poor stock price 
performance, Gilson (1989) finds an abnormally high rate of top management turnover and that 
                                                 
2
 Seasoned equity offers representing greater than 5% of existing share capital in a single year or 7.5% on a three 
year rolling basis are required to use rights-preserving methods unless such rights were waived at a general meeting.  
Waiving rights requires a super-majority vote with 75% of shareholders having to agree. 
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21% of all changes are initiated by bank lenders.
3
  Bank involvement in top management 
changes is inferred from news reports of explicit bank intervention, rumoured intervention, or the 
replacement of incumbent management with a bank appointee.  Ofek (1993) finds that private 
leverage, rather than public leverage, increases the likelihood of top management replacement 
following a large stock price decline.  Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find monitoring by main 
banks, which hold debt and equity positions in borrowing firms, increases the sensitivity of non-
routine top management turnover to poor accounting performance.  We expect this monitoring 
role to be especially pronounced in the UK given the relative importance of banks in providing 
debt capital (see Marchica, 2008).  Franks et al. (2001) find that board turnover is increasing 
with leverage for poorly performing UK firms, but do not distinguish between lending sources.   
For our sample firms, newspaper reports highlight refinancing of bank debt as a frequent 
concern in articles announcing forced CEO departures.  Several stories hint at a relation, but not 
surprisingly do not explicitly link the two events given banks’ desire to avoid adverse publicity 
from being direct associated with restructuring events.  For example, the ousting of John 
Hancock from MFI Furniture Group in 2005 was attributed to the board of directors, but reports 
highlighted that the firm was also in talks with its main lending bank (The Guardian, 4 October 
2005).  At the time of the announcement MFI had reportedly used £150m of a £185m banking 
facility and was in talks with Royal Bank of Scotland to extend this.  Within six months the new 
CEO, Matthew Ingle, had secured a new £150m loan facility and raised £92m from the sale of a 
major subsidiary (The Guardian, 1 March 2006).  Such reporting suggests that banks monitor 
through placing pressure on the board of directors, as the main internal governance mechanism, 
to discipline poorly performing CEOs.  In limited circumstances, such as the highlighted case of 
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 He argues that this figure most likely understates the true impact of bank monitoring on top management changes 
given litigation risk under lender liability laws if banks have been found to act against the interests of stockholders. 
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Jarvis in the next section, banks may also explicitly request the removal of the incumbent CEO 
as a condition of renegotiation of existing funding and provision of new loans.  These news 
reports highlight a role for bank monitoring in forced CEO replacement when firms are close to 
breaching covenants, need to refinance existing loans, or gain access to new loans to restructure 
operations.  Accordingly, the first hypothesis is, 
 
H1: The relation between forced CEO turnover and cash flow performance is stronger for firms 
borrowing from banks.   
 
2.3.2. Likelihood of external CEO succession 
Parrino (1997) argues that external CEO successors are more likely to be appointed when 
there is a need to restructure failing operations and poorly performing senior management, and to 
bring an alternative perspective to the firm.  He proposes that the likelihood of external 
succession will increase following poor performance and forced CEO turnover.  External 
succession announcements result in a positive stock price response relative to replacement by 
internally appointed successors (see Huson et al., 2001; Dahya and McConnell, 2005) 
Gilson (1989) finds that bank initiated top management changes were also more likely to 
be associated with externally appointed replacements, including turnaround specialists.  
Similarly, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that external successors are more likely to be 
appointed following top management turnover in Japan when firms have ties to a main bank that 
is expected to actively monitor top management.   
News coverage of the departure of CEO Kevin Hyde from maintenance group Jarvis 
suggests such a scenario.  Jarvis received £25million in new funding from its banks and agreed 
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to launch a disposal programme to raise up to £150million.  Shortly afterwards, Mr Hyde left his 
position as CEO, which was reportedly at the behest of bank lenders (The Telegraph, 29 
September 2004).  Moreover, the reporting of Mr Hyde’s departure highlights comments from 
analysts that the required financial restructuring of the firm was beyond My Hyde’s skill set.  His 
successor, Alan Lovell, was appointed from outside the company with the support of the firm’s 
banks and had prior experience of restructuring poorly performing businesses (The Telegraph, 14 
November 2004).
4
  Given the previous discussion we expect that bank monitors, having 
refinanced existing debt and/or provided new lending facilities to distressed firms can require 
replacement CEOs from outside the current board that have expertise in operational and financial 
restructuring.  Accordingly, the second hypothesis is, 
 
H2: The likelihood of an external successor being appointed following CEO turnover increases 
when firms borrow from bank lenders. 
 
2.3.3. Stock price response to CEO turnover announcements 
Gilson (1990) proposes two competing explanations of board resignations and externally 
appointed successors in his sample of financially distressed firms.  Firstly, management 
replacement reflects disciplinary action against poorly performing managers and leads to the 
appointment of higher calibre replacements.  Alternatively, top management departures may not 
be value maximizing.  If good managers are incorrectly targeted by bank monitoring this 
represents a value loss from monitoring.  Separately, Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra (2013) find 
                                                 
4
 CEO succession at MFI Furniture Group resulted in the appointment of an internal CEO successor, which was 
initially a disappointment to large investors (The Guardian, 4 October 2005).  However, the new CEO Mr Ingle 
displayed many of the traits associated with an externally hired CEO.  He committed to restructuring the business by 
selling off assets to raise cash and was able to convince its banks to provide new lending facilities as a result. 
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that creditor-directors on the firm’s board can influence investment and financing policies to 
their own benefit and at the expense of the firm’s stockholders. 
Gilson (1989, 1990) tracks managers’ careers following resignations to differentiate 
between these competing hypotheses.  He finds that departing managers at distressed firms are 
less likely to be employed in comparable roles as inside and outside board members at other 
firms in the three years following their departure.  He concludes that dismissal following poor 
performance and financial distress has reduced the value of departing managers’ human capital 
and that monitoring was targeted at low quality managers.  Kang and Shivdasani (1995) provide 
complementary evidence in support of an improved management hypothesis.  They find that 
forced top management replacement and external succession in Japanese firms is initiated by 
main bank lenders following poor performance and followed by subsequent improvement in 
operating performance.  We examine the value of managerial replacement through an event 
study of the stock price response to CEO departure announcements.  Accordingly, the third 
hypothesis is,  
 
H3: The market reaction to disciplinary CEO turnover increases when firms borrow from bank 
lenders. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample construction and classification of CEO succession 
We construct our sample by studying CEO succession and borrowing source for firms in 
the FTSE-350 index of the LSE over the time period 2000 to 2008.  The FTSE-350 index covers 
the largest 350 firms by market capitalization that maintain their primary listing on the LSE.  We 
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exclude financial firms and utilities given the arguably stringent regulation that such firms are 
subject to and the frequency, and complexity, of security issuance by financial institutions.  We 
focus on the largest firms on the LSE to ensure sufficient news coverage of CEO replacement 
and debt issuance announcements.  Accounting and stock price data is collected from 2000 to 
2007 and this is related to CEO turnover and debt issuance in the subsequent year.   
To minimize concerns surrounding survivorship and new list bias we allow firms to enter 
the sample as they join the FTSE-350 list during the sample period and backdate our data 
collection to the beginning of the sample period for any years where the firm is quoted on the 
LSE but was not part of the FTSE-350.  Firms remain in the sample even where they 
subsequently drop out of the FTSE-350 index but remain quoted on the LSE.  Firms drop out of 
the sample only when they are delisted.
5
  We require only that firms have at least two 
consecutive years of published annual reports such that we can relate CEO turnover in year t+1 
to existing debt and firm characteristics in year t, and new debt issuance in year t+1.  For each 
firm that meets our selection criteria we collect the firm’s annual reports from 2000 to 2008.  
Annual reports are used to track CEO succession and to identify the source of existing 
borrowings from the footnotes to the financial statements.  Our sample selection process 
produces a final sample of up to 2,110 firm-year observations across 310 individual firms.   
Reports of CEO turnover and external succession are collected from annual reports and 
Nexis UK.  Nexis UK provides coverage of national and regional newspapers, including the 
Financial Times, and regulatory news feeds of announcements to the LSE.  We classify CEO 
turnover as occurring where the name of the top officer in the annual report changes from year t 
to t+1.  Following Conyon and Florou (2002), if the firm reports a chief executive (officer) we 
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 For example, if a firm is a constituent of the FTSE-350 in 2004 and 2005 we track the company back to 2000 or 
when it first listed and we track forward until the end of the sample period or delisting, whichever comes first.   
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classify this individual as the CEO.  In the absence of a chief executive we examine the annual 
report; particularly the list of board directors, the compensation committee report, and the review 
of operations to determine the most significant executive, and classify this individual as the 
CEO.
6
  Hereafter, we refer to the top officer as the CEO.   
We define FORCED as a dummy variable set equal to one if the firm experiences forced 
CEO turnover, and zero otherwise.  We follow Huson et al. (2001) and classify CEO turnover as 
forced where news reports suggest that the departing CEO was ‘fired,’ ‘forced out,’ ‘removed,’ 
‘ousted,’ left following ‘policy disagreements,’ or similar.  For all remaining turnover 
announcements, we classify CEO turnover as forced where the CEO is under 60 years of age and 
the turnover announcement (1) does not report the reason for departure as involving death, ill 
health, or the acceptance of another position (elsewhere or within the firm) or (2) reports that the 
CEO is retiring within six months of the departure announcement.
7
   
We define OUTSIDE as a dummy variable set equal to one if a new CEO is appointed 
from outside the firm, and zero otherwise.  We classify new CEOs as outsiders if the CEO joined 
the firm within the previous 12 months.  It is unlikely that the performance of a newly appointed 
director whose tenure with the firm spanned such a short time period would warrant promotion 
to the position of CEO, suggesting that such a director was likely appointed to the board with the 
expectation of being elevated to the CEO position (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). 
 
                                                 
6
 Typically this will either be a group managing director working with a non-executive chairman of the board, or an 
executive chairman of the board.  It is apparent when collecting our sample data that large UK firms have gradually 
moved towards universal adoption of the CEO title.   
7
 We pay particular attention to future employment prospects for those CEO changes where the CEO is between 50 
and 60 and states retirement as the reason for their departure.  Since its adoption of the Higgs Review in 2003, the 
UK Corporate Governance Code suggests that CEOs should not succeed to become chairman of the same firm.  
Anecdotal evidence from our data collection suggest that one unintended consequence of this proposal has been to 
create a market in otherwise early retirements for CEOs at large UK firms to become executive chairman at another 
large firm.   
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3.2. Board and firm characteristics 
We supplement our data collection with a range of firm, CEO and board characteristics that 
have been shown to be related to CEO succession.  We control firm size using ASSETS, which 
is defined as book value of assets for the accounting year deflated at consumer price inflation to 
the year 2000.  In our empirical specifications we use the natural logarithm of firm assets.   
We include CEO status as a member of the firm’s founding family as an explanatory 
variable in forced CEO turnover regressions.  Huson et al. (2001) and Hillier and McColgan 
(2009) find that founders are less likely to be forced out than non-founder CEOs.  We define 
FOUNDER as a dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO is associated with the founding of 
the company, and zero otherwise.  Following Adams et al. (2009), we associate founding events 
with start-up CEOs and their descendants, and we also consider founders as CEOs who led major 
control changes through the acquisition of stock and buyout deals.   
To capture the monitoring or entrenching role of bank relationships on the firm’s board we 
define BANK AFFILIATED as a dummy variable set equal to one if the firm has a bank 
affiliated director on the board, and zero otherwise.  Following Sisli-Ciamarra (2012) bank 
affiliations are inferred when a sample firm director is also a present serving director on the 
board of a bank, whether in an executive or non-executive capacity. 
Prior studies on CEO succession have also shown that external hires are more likely when 
there are more independent directors on the board (see Huson et al., 2001; Dahya and 
McConnell, 2005).  This can arise due to better monitoring by more independent boards, or is 
simply the result of a mechanical relation where boards with more non-executives provide fewer 
viable internal executive candidates to replace a departing CEO.  FRACTION NED is the total 
number of non-executive directors on the board divided by the size of the board.  Data on board 
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structure, bank affiliations of board members, and CEO characteristics is collected from annual 
reports and the Nexis UK database.
8
   
 
3.3. Firm performance 
We use two core measures of cash flow performance in our regressions.  ΔIROA is the 
change in industry-adjusted return on assets (IROA) over the firm’s accounting year.  IROA is 
defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by 
book value of total assets minus the same ratio for the median Datastream firm in the same FTSE 
level three industry group during the same calendar year.
9
   
We also include interest coverage as a second measure of firm performance that is likely to 
be strongly correlated with the incentives of lenders to monitor and is defined as EBITDA 
divided by total interest expense.  Interest coverage is a frequently used covenant in private 
lending agreements, providing a focus for lenders to become active monitors if the covenant is 
close to being breached.  We define LOW IC as a dummy variable set equal to minus one where 
the firm has an interest coverage ratio of less than 0.80, and zero otherwise.
10
  Asquith et al. 
(1994) find that firms with interest coverage between 0.8 and 1.0 in a single year are unlikely to 
be distressed.  Such firms have sufficient liquid resources to meet that year’s interest payments 
                                                 
8
 We also re-estimate our analysis to include a number of corporate governance variables that have been found to be 
correlated with CEO turnover and outside succession decisions (see Weisbach, 1988; Denis et al., 1997).  We find 
that measures of CEO tenure, board size and institutional ownership are unrelated to forced CEO turnover and 
external CEO succession for our sample.  Non-executive director representation is unrelated to forced turnover.  
Director ownership reduces the likelihood of forced turnover, but is unrelated to outside succession decisions.  In 
each case, inclusion of these variables has no impact on the statistical significance of our leverage and debt issuance 
variables.   
9
 FTSE level three industry groups are broadly comparable to two digit SIC codes.   
10
 We set the variable equal to negative one, rather than plus one, simply to maintain consistency in the presentation 
of empirical results whereby poor performance is associated with a negative value.   
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and were unlikely to undertake restructuring actions that suggest a need to resolve financial 
distress.
11
  Firms that have no debt outstanding are coded as zero for this variable.   
Accounting profit and interest coverage ratios are constructed from EBITDA, which 
proxies for underlying cash flows, and are expected to be of greater interest to lending 
institutions.  Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that the relation between top management 
turnover and firm performance in Japanese firms is stronger for firms with a main bank 
relationship only when firm performance is measured using accounting profit.
12
  To aid 
presentation in our results we report a single variable PERFORM corresponding to the 
appropriate firm performance measure specified in the regression title. 
 
3.4. Classification of debt sources and new issuance data 
Annual reports are also used to collect data on several debt variables for sample firms.  We 
hand collect data on outstanding debt from public bonds, banks, and non-bank private lenders 
from the footnotes to each firm’s financial statements.  Following Johnson (1997) we require that 
debt is explicitly defined as bank debt in the financial statements, otherwise we classify private 
debt as non-bank private debt.
13
   
                                                 
11
 These authors define financial distress as interest coverage of less than 0.8 in a single year or less than 1.0 for two 
consecutive years.  Since we relate CEO turnover and external succession to a single year of firm performance we 
focus on the one year distress measure defined in their study.   
12
 In further testing, we also include RETURN as a measure of firm performance.  This is defined as the daily buy-
and-hold return on the stock over the firm’s accounting year minus the return on the FTSE-All Share Index over the 
corresponding period.  Daily stock returns are calculated from Datastream return index values, which capture the 
change in stock price and income from dividend payments.  We find that borrowing source has no impact on the 
strength of the relation between stock price performance and forced CEO turnover.  We attribute this insignificant 
result, in comparison to our later significant findings for cash flow profitability, to the importance of cash flows in 
determining a firm’s ability to service interest and principal repayments on debt, and therefore for lenders to 
monitor. 
13
 Given the ambiguity in classifying balance sheet debt that reflects the amalgamation of several previously 
announced debt offers and lines of credit we carry out robustness testing using private leverage and private debt 
issuance as alternative explanatory variables in Section 4.5.   
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We measure existing debt as the ratio of total debt from any single source divided by book 
value of total assets.  PUBLIC LEVERAGE is the ratio of total publicly traded debt divided by 
the book value of total assets.  BANK LEVERAGE is the ratio of total bank debt, including 
overdrafts, divided by the book value of total assets.
14
  We focus on measures of debt source 
divided by total assets, rather than relative to total debt, in order to measure the relative 
contribution of a borrowing source to the capital structure of a firm.  Gilson (1990) argues that 
creditor control over firm decision making increases with the importance of debt in the firm’s 
overall capital structure.  Focusing on debt source in proportion to total borrowing may overstate 
the importance of individual sources of debt for low leverage firms.  
Debt issuance announcements are measured in year t+1 to capture the simultaneity 
between accessing new funds and disciplinary top management replacement.  Where firms have 
multiple debt issuances during any given year, we combine this together as a single binary 
variable to indicate that a firm has borrowed from one of our listed sources.  The empirical 
design is used to highlight the potential monitoring role that different lenders play when deciding 
to grant credit.  When collecting data on debt issues we follow Hadlock and James (2002) in 
using a large range of keywords to search for articles on debt issues sourced from Nexis UK.
15
    
We define PUBLIC ISSUE as a dummy variable set equal to one if the firm announces an issue 
of publicly tradable bonds, and zero otherwise.  BANK ISSUE is a dummy variable set equal to 
one if the firm announces an issue of bank debt, and zero otherwise.  To better screen firms that 
are dependent on a single borrowing source, and theoretically subject to greater bank monitoring, 
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 All of our empirical results are robust to using book value of debt divided by the sum of market value of equity, 
book value of debt and book value of preferred stock as an alternative explanatory variable. 
15
 We search under the terms ‘line of credit,’ ‘loan agreement,’ ‘bank loan,’ ‘credit agreement,’ ‘credit line,’ ‘credit 
facility,’ ‘credit extension,’ ‘new loan,’ ‘loan renewal,’ ‘loan revision,’ ‘loan extension,’ ‘term loan,’ ‘debt issue,’ 
‘debt offer,’ ‘public debt issue,’ and ‘public debt offer.’ Additionally, to augment the sample, the following 
keywords are also employed: ‘bond,’ ‘bond issue,’ ‘debt notes,’ ‘loan facility,’ ‘working capital facility,’ ‘private 
placement,’ and ‘overdraft.’ 
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we also replace each of our ISSUE variables with ONLY postscripts.  These variables are set 
equal to one if the company borrows only from the specified single lending source during year 
t+1, and zero otherwise.   
Table 1 provides a summary of the key variables used in this study, their definition, and the 
source of data.   
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.5. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for firm data, board and CEO characteristics, and debt issuance are 
presented in Table 2.  Panel A presents data on borrowing source, board, and CEO 
characteristics.  To aid comparison with US research, we report the proportion of total debt that 
is borrowed from our previously described public and bank sources.  Despite our focus on large 
firms, bank debt makes up over 60% of total borrowing.  Approximately 20% of balance sheet 
debt is from publicly traded bonds.  This lies between the 26% found by Johnson (1997) and 
14% found by Hadlock and James (2002) for more general samples of US firms where the 
typical firm is substantially smaller than for our sample.  Given that the ability to borrow in 
public markets is predicted to be increasing with firm size and borrower reputation (Diamond, 
1991), our descriptive statistics highlight that UK firms are heavily reliant on borrowing from 
banks.  Marchica (2008) finds that UK firms place greater reliance on short-term debt than 
comparable US firms.  Given that bank debt is generally issued over shorter maturities (see 
Denis and Mihov, 2003), these findings can be viewed as complementary and highlight the 
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potential for a strong bank monitoring role given banks’ greater importance in the capital 
structure of UK firms.   
The average board has 9 members, of whom, 55.87% are non-executives.  Board size and 
non-executive representation is higher than found in earlier UK research (see Hillier et al., 2005), 
which reflects the larger firms used in our sample.  The 24.64% of directors with a bank 
affiliation is close to the figure of 27.23% reported by Sisli-Ciamarra (2012) for S&P 500 firms 
in 2002.
16
 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We report data on CEO succession in Panel B.  17.68% of CEOs are classified as founders, 
which is comparable to the 15.58% in Adams et al. (2009) for Fortune 500 firms.  The forced 
turnover rate of 4.28% is similar to the 3.98% in Conyon and Florou (2002).  We find that 
externally hired CEOs comprise 40.07% of all successions.  This rate is higher than the overall 
outside succession rate of 29.83% reported in Dahya and McConnell (2005), but is very similar 
to the rate of 39.16% they report in the final year of their sample, 1999.  The rate of external 
CEO succession is generally higher than observed in US studies.  For example, Huson et al. 
(2001) find that 19.00% of all successions involve outsiders. 
We report descriptive statistics for new debt issuance in Panel C, where data is separated 
by whether the firm borrowed from public or bank debt sources and whether they borrowed only 
from that specific source.  We report separate data for firms borrowing from single or multiple 
                                                 
16
 Our subsequent results are unaffected if we experiment with alternative versions of this definition covering 
executive and non-executive directors and extending the definition of a banking relationship to include past as well 
as present directorships.  These groups comprise 4.17%, 20.76% and 37.96% of the firm years where our sample 
firms are classified as having a bank affiliated director. 
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borrowing sources given the findings of Johnson (1997) and Hadlock and James (2002) that 
firms with access to public debt markets also choose to borrow from banks.  To better understand 
the monitoring efficiency of banks it will be important to consider separately those firms who 
have not been able to borrow from a number of sources.  Consistent with the balance sheet data 
in Panel A, UK firms have a strong reliance on bank debt when borrowing.  We find 675 firm 
years with announcements of debt issuance, of which 453 involve the issuance of bank debt.  
Conditional on issuing debt, over half of the sample (342 firm years) announce only the issuance 
of bank debt.  The frequency of public debt issuance is substantially lower than found in Hadlock 
and James (2002) and Denis and Mihov (2003) for US firms, further highlighting the reliance of 
UK firms on bank debt.  Given the relatively larger size of firms listed on the FTSE-350 index, 
theoretical models of debt source predict that our sample should issue publicly tradable bonds at 
a higher frequency than found in US studies (see Diamond, 1984; Fama, 1985).   
Collectively, these statistics point towards an important role for bank lenders in the 
monitoring of UK firms.  Given the important role that banks play in providing debt we expect to 
observe an important monitoring role in the forced removal of the incumbent CEO and an 
increased likelihood of replacement by an externally hired CEO.  We also expect that in light of 
their superior monitoring ability, bank initiated CEO succession decisions are value adding for 
firm stockholders.  We investigate these arguments in the remainder of our paper.   
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Probit specification and correlation amongst explanatory variables 
In analyzing forced CEO turnover and external CEO succession we estimate the following 
probit models: 
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 𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑖 = 1) =  𝛷(𝑋𝑖𝛽)              (1) 
 𝑃𝑟(𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑖 = 1) =  𝛷(𝑋𝑖𝛽)              (2) 
 
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution, Xi is the vector of explanatory variables 
and β is the population vector to be estimated by maximum likelihood.  As previously discussed, 
forced CEO turnover and external succession occurs in year t+1 and is related to firm, lender and 
CEO characteristics in year t, and debt issuance in year t+1. 
To aid interpretation of results, both coefficient estimates and marginal effects are 
presented.  The marginal effect of a regressor is the derivative of the probability of turnover with 
respect to an individual regressor and is calculated at the mean value of all variables.  For 
dummy variables, the marginal effect represents a discrete change in the dummy variable from 
zero to one.  All probit models of forced CEO turnover and external succession include year and 
FTSE level two industry dummies, which are not reported for brevity. 
Denis and Mihov (2003) document significant links between firm size, managerial control, 
and borrowing source that may cause difficulty in interpreting our future regressions.  To 
preliminarily investigate such concerns, we present the results of pairwise correlations for our 
explanatory variables in Table 3.  As expected, our two measures of cash flow performance are 
positively correlated.  CEO founder status is negatively correlated with both firm size and non-
executive representation on the board, which suggests that founder firms are smaller and have 
less independent boards (see Hillier and McColgan, 2009).   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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The frequency of new loan issuance, whether through public or bank debt, is positively 
correlated with firm size.  This most likely reflects smaller firms being screened out from credit 
markets altogether.  Crucially the size of the correlation between firm size and public debt 
issuance is over twice the size of the correlation between firm size and bank loan announcements 
and this relationship is even more pronounced when studying firms borrowing only from bank or 
public debt sources in any given year.  We also find that bank director affiliations are positively 
correlated with firm size and access to new debt, whether from publicly traded bonds or bank 
loans.  This is consistent with the findings of Sisli-Ciamarra (2012) that bank-affiliated boards 
have higher leverage and easier access to new loan financing.   
Existing public leverage is positively correlated with firm size while bank leverage is 
negatively correlated with size.  We find a negative correlation between ΔIROA and existing 
bank leverage but otherwise existing leverage and access to new loans are uncorrelated with cash 
flow performance.  Existing bank leverage and public leverage are negatively correlated, 
suggesting they are substitutes in corporate financing.  However, public leverage is positively 
correlated with future borrowing frequency from both banks and public debt markets.  This again 
is best explained by firm size and access to credit markets. 
These initial findings conform to prior evidence on debt source and firm characteristics 
(see Johnson, 1997; Hadlock and James, 2002; Denis and Mihov, 2003).  Large firms are more 
likely to access public debt markets and corporate governance characteristics are correlated with 
both firm size and potentially borrowing source.  Crucially there is little evidence of correlation 
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between borrowing source and firm performance that may cause concerns relating to spurious 
correlation or multicolinearity in our later testing.
17
 
 
4.2. CEO succession and the source of debt financing 
We begin our analysis by considering the determinants of forced CEO succession.  We 
report separate regressions for firms borrowing from any source of debt and for those firms 
borrowing only from one source; our ISSUE and ONLY postscripts described in Section 3.4.  
We interact these issuance variables with firm performance to allow for differences in the 
relation between firm performance and forced turnover conditional on debt issuance.  These 
results are presented in Table 4.  For our control variables we find that forced CEO turnover is 
unrelated to ASSETS and is significant and negatively related to both FOUNDER and 
PERFORM across all our regression models. 
In all specifications BANK LEVERAGE is significant and positively related to forced 
CEO turnover at the 5% level or better, while PUBLIC LEVERAGE is statistically insignificant.  
This finding highlights an important monitoring role for bank lenders relative to public lenders in 
forcing CEO turnover.  We find no relation between BANK AFFILIATED and the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover.  Our finding provides mixed evidence in support of Ahn and Choi (2009), 
who show that bank monitoring directly influences corporate decision making in a manner that is 
not observed for public lenders.   
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
17
 For all regressions we have estimated variance inflation factor scores for explanatory variables.  The highest value 
is 3.50 and most values lie between 1 and 3, which suggests that multicolinearity has not biased our future 
regression results. 
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Our results for ΔIROA provide mixed support the superiority of bank monitoring.  The 
interaction between both BANK ISSUE and BANK ONLY and ΔIROA is negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  However, we also find that the interaction between PUBLIC ONLY 
and ΔIROA is significant and negative.  Prior theory on the superiority of bank monitoring does 
not rule out a monitoring role for public bondholders, and our result can be interpreted as 
supporting Easterbrook’s (1984) general view of capital markets as effective monitors when 
firms seek to raise finance.  For our LOW IC variable the interaction between bank debt issuance 
and firm performance is significant for BANK ONLY but not for BANK ISSUE.  Our results 
suggest that banks are able to force CEO turnover in financially distressed firms only when those 
firms have no alternative source of borrowing.  We find no evidence that public lenders play a 
role in forced CEO turnover decisions based on poor interest coverage as a measure of financial 
distress.
18
   
Our results suggest that the relation between firm cash flows and forced CEO turnover is 
stronger when firms borrow from banks.  The strong and positive relation between FORCED and 
BANK LEVERAGE, and the significance of the interaction between firm performance using 
ΔIROA and LOW IC and bank debt issuance provides evidence that private lenders are active 
monitors of top management.  This supports the superior monitoring incentives assigned to 
private lenders by Diamond (1984), Rajan (1992), and Nakamura (1993) and is largely 
supportive of H1 that the relation between forced CEO turnover and cash flow performance is 
                                                 
18
 For brevity we do not consider the interaction between existing public or private leverage, bank director 
affiliation, and firm performance when studying forced CEO turnover in Table 4. In further testing we transform 
bank leverage to a series of dummy variables that can be interacted with firm performance to produce meaningful 
interpretation.  We set dummy variables for bank and public leverage above the sample median.  Following, 
Hadlock and James (2002) we also define a bank dependent dummy variable where bank debt to total debt is above 
the median ratio of 0.7944 and the firm has no public debt outstanding.  We find no evidence that these variables 
interact significantly with firm performance to increase the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to performance.  
Similarly, we find no evidence that bank director affiliation interacts with either firm performance or debt issuance 
to influence the probability of forced CEO turnover. 
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stronger when firms borrow from bank lenders.  Our findings also highlight that such monitoring 
of poorly performing firms is conditional on provision of bank financing through renewals and 
issuance of new loans but is largely unaffected by existing banking relationships and leverage. 
Our findings complement and extend the inferences drawn from event studies that report a 
positive stock price response to bank loan announcements and research on the role that banks 
and other private lenders play in provision of finance to firms who are unable to borrow in public 
bond markets.  Our results also complement earlier studies showing a direct relation between 
bank monitoring and firm decision making (see Gilson, 1989; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995).  
 
4.3. Lender monitoring and CEO succession 
We test H2 in Table 5, which presents the results of a probit model where the dependent 
variable is OUTSIDE.  We relate outside succession to our previously documented firm 
performance variables, ASSETS, and the previously described lender monitoring variables.  In 
addition to these, we include FORCED as an explanatory variable that we expect to be positively 
related to the incidence of outside succession and FRACTION NED to capture the relationship 
between board monitoring and the increased probability of outside succession. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Across all regressions we find that outside succession is positively related to FORCED and 
FRACTION NED but is unrelated to ASSETS.  Outside succession is weakly negatively 
correlated with poor ΔIROA but is unrelated to LOW IC.  That outside succession is more 
frequent following forced turnover and on boards with a higher fraction of non-executive 
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directors supports Parrino (1997) and suggests an important role for outside hires in firms that 
require a change in management policy.  It also hints at an important role of bank lenders in 
external CEO succession given our previous support for H1 that bank debt issuance strengthens 
the relation between forced CEO turnover and firm performance. 
Consistent with our earlier work for forced CEO turnover to firm performance, we find that 
the likelihood of external CEO succession is unrelated to the source of existing loans or existing 
bank director affiliations.  This supports the argument that banks are powerful monitors when 
providing capital to firms, but less so when monitoring existing loans.  However, we find that 
BANK ISSUE and BANK ONLY are associated with an economic and statistically significant 
increase in the likelihood of external CEO succession.  These results provide strong support for 
H2 that the likelihood of an external successor being appointed following CEO turnover 
increases when firms borrow from bank lenders.  The marginal effect of changing the debt 
issuance dummy variables from zero to one range from 0.1830 and 0.2671 depending on the 
performance measure studied and whether firms are restricted to bank borrowing only or have 
borrowed from banks and other lenders in the same year.
19
   
These results provide further evidence on the role of banks in monitoring borrower firms.  
Our findings suggest that well informed bank lenders with strong financial incentives to monitor 
client firms are able to monitor poorly performing CEOs and replace them with successors who 
are more likely to restructure operating and financing policies with a view to maximizing the 
value of the firm’s assets.   
                                                 
19
 Huson et al. (2001) note that CEO succession decisions are conditional on CEO turnover and estimate succession 
regressions as the second stage of a bivariate probit model with selection.  In further testing we replicate this 
approach.  Our first stage turnover regression describes the probability of CEO turnover as a function of firm size, 
CEO founder status, firm performance, and a CEO at retirement age dummy variable (RETIRE) that is set equal to 
one if the incumbent CEO is aged 60 or above, and zero otherwise.  We find that TURNOVER is positively related 
to RETIRE and negatively related to PERFORM.  All regression coefficients in our second stage regressions retain 
their sign and earlier statistical significance. 
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4.4. Does bank monitoring add value? 
To test H3 we carry out an event study of the stock price reaction to CEO succession 
announcements and report results separately for different classifications of succession and 
whether the firm borrowed from different debt sources during the year of CEO turnover.  We 
locate the date of the first announcement of CEO succession for our 308 cases of turnover from 
the range of news sources described in section 3.1.  
Our event study is estimated using the standard market model approach to calculate 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs).  The estimation period for the market model 
covers the 170 trading days from day -200 to day -31, where day 0 is the date of the first 
announcement of CEO succession.  We use the FTSE-350 index as the market benchmark in 
estimating the market model parameters.  Our sample size is reduced to 302 as a result of 
missing stock price data to estimate market model parameters for six announcements.   
The event study results are presented in Table 6.  CAARs are broken down by succession 
type, whether the firm borrowed from public bond markets or from a bank during the financial 
year of CEO turnover, and for the interaction between succession type and borrowing source.  
Our base results for CEO succession highlight a significant and negative stock price response to 
CEO turnover in general, and specifically for forced CEO turnover decisions.  The market 
reaction to successor decisions is negative, irrespective of whether an inside or outside hire is 
appointed to replace the departing CEO.  While inconsistent with much of the prior US literature 
in this area (see Huson et al., 2001), our finding is consistent with the significantly negative 
market reaction to CEO dismissal announcements at UK firms found by Dedman and Lin (2002).  
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Despite the generally negative reaction to CEO succession, our sub-sample of CEO 
succession during the same financial year of bank borrowing elicits a significantly positive 
market reaction of 1.26%.  The market reaction to succession in years of public debt issuance is 
insignificantly negative.  These results hold when we focus on succession for firms only 
borrowing from public markets or banks and provide initial support for H3. 
To explore in more detail the link from disciplinary CEO turnover and bank monitoring we 
further separate our borrowing and CEO succession announcements for the sub-categories of 
FORCED and OUTSIDE.  Our findings highlight a large positive response to forced CEO 
turnover where firms have borrowed from banks during the year of turnover.  The CAAR of 
5.78% for bank borrowing and forced turnover is economically large in absolute terms and more 
so in comparison to the large negative CAAR of -4.52% for the overall forced CEO turnover 
sample.  Our findings for external CEO successions follow the same pattern of a significant and 
positive CAAR for succession during the same year as bank borrowings, but are economically 
smaller than those found for forced turnover.  Our results for disciplinary CEO succession and 
public debt issuance are insignificant.  These results provide strong support for H3 that the 
market reaction to disciplinary CEO turnover increases when firms borrow from banks.  We 
attribute this finding to the monitoring role that banks can play in identifying and encouraging 
boards to remove low quality CEOs and their replacement with higher quality managers. 
Prior research has shown that the stock price reaction to CEO succession is correlated with 
firm size and industry, which are also correlated with borrowing source (see Johnson, 1997; 
Parrino, 1997).  To address such concerns, we extend our univariate analysis and regress three-
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day event study cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) against these characteristics in addition 
CEO turnover and debt issuance variables.  We control for existing borrowing source, bank 
director affiliations, debt issuance source, ASSETS as a measure of firm size, and industry and 
year dummies.  The use of cross-sectional regressions reduces our sample size to 295 
observations.  We report the results of this testing in Table 7.
20
 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
In all regression models firm size is unrelated to the market reaction to CEO succession 
announcements.  We again find that the market reaction to forced turnover is negative and highly 
significant.  Outside succession is not significantly related to announcement CARs after 
controlling for other factors, notably the relation between forced turnover and outside succession 
documented in Table 5.  We find no evidence of a relation between bank director affiliations, the 
source of existing leverage and the market reaction to CEO succession announcements.  This is 
consistent with our earlier results for forced turnover and outside succession and hints that 
lenders are effective monitors when firms need to renew existing loans or raise new debt 
financing. 
In model 1 we examine the interaction between debt issuance source and forced CEO 
turnover.  Consistent with our univariate analysis, conditional on borrowing from banks during 
the year of CEO turnover we find a positive and significant relation between forced turnover and 
CARs.  The coefficient of 0.1255 is economically large and suggests a strong stockholder benefit 
to bank induced disciplinary CEO turnover, which again supports H3.  We find no relationship 
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 We also re-run regressions with additional controls for various measures of firm performance, CEO tenure, board 
size and independence, and director and institutional ownership, which are unrelated to the market response to CEO 
replacement announcements. 
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between public debt issuance and the market reaction to forced CEO turnover.  In model 2 we 
repeat our test for the interaction between outside succession and new debt issuance.  The results 
are weaker and suggest little effect between debt issuance source, external CEO succession, and 
the market reaction to CEO replacement after controlling for forced turnover.  To examine this 
further, we jointly test the market reaction to forced turnover, outside succession, and debt 
issuance in models 3 and 4 of Table 7.  Model 3 reports results for all public and bank debt 
issuance and model 4 reports results for those firms borrowing only from a single source.  We 
find that the significance of our results for forced turnover at bank monitored firms remains, 
while the market response to external CEO succession is insignificant irrespective of borrowing 
source.   
Overall, our results suggest that bank monitoring from debt issuance is associated with an 
increase in stockholder wealth at the time of disciplinary CEO turnover decisions.  This supports 
H3 and is consistent with Gilson (1989) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) who find bank 
monitoring is focused on low quality managers at financially distressed and poorly performing 
firms. 
 
4.5. Robustness testing on debt source, maturity, and contemporaneous changes in leverage 
Our core finding that bank monitoring has a direct effect on CEO succession decisions is 
robust to a series of further analysis of debt characteristics and issuance, which we detail in this 
section.
21
   
We have previously defined bank borrowing as only those loans explicitly described in the 
financial statements as bank debt.  Classification of private debt between bank and other non-
bank private sources is straight-forward from news reports when firms announce raising new 
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 All results from this section are available on request from the authors.   
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finance.  Such classification is inherently more subjective when dealing with previously issued 
loans.  To investigate this issue in more detail we re-estimate our regression results substituting 
private leverage and issuance for bank leverage and issuance.  In all regressions, the likelihood 
of forced CEO turnover increases with existing private leverage, the sensitivity of forced 
turnover to firm performance is stronger for firms issuing private debt, and external succession is 
more likely when firms borrow in private debt markets.  We also find no relation between CEO 
succession decisions and non-bank private debt measures of leverage and new issuance. 
Close parallels may also be drawn with research on borrowing source and studies on the 
maturity of leverage.  Marchica (2008) finds that UK firms borrow for shorter maturities in 
comparison to US firms, which she attributes to their greater reliance on bank debt.  Since bank 
debt is typically issued for shorter maturities and debt maturity may be correlated with credit risk 
our results may be driven by the maturity rather than source of leverage (see Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Denis and Mihov, 2003).  To address this concern, we run separate analysis of CEO 
succession decisions with short- and long-term leverage ratios as explanatory variables where 
debt with a maturity of less than one year is defined as short-term.  Data on the maturity of 
leverage is also hand collected from annual reports.  We find no evidence of a maturity effect in 
forced CEO turnover or external succession decisions after controlling for debt source.  
Moreover, the relation between bank debt and forced turnover is unaffected by additional 
controls for the maturity structure of corporate debt. 
Finally, we re-estimate CEO succession regressions to control for changes in leverage and 
other firm characteristics during the year of CEO turnover.  This test allows us to consider the 
robustness of our findings to simultaneous changes in borrowing firm characteristics in the year 
of CEO turnover that may be correlated with debt issuance.  We examine changes in firm 
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characteristics, existing leverage from bank and public sources, bank director affiliations, and 
board characteristics previously examined in Tables 4, 5, and 7.  We find that inclusion of these 
change variables is not consistently related to forced CEO turnover and external CEO succession 
decisions, but we do find limited evidence that increases in bank leverage and bank director 
affiliations during the year of CEO turnover are positively related to CARs on announcement of 
CEO turnover.  Inclusion of these variables does not impact on the previously documented role 
of bank debt issuance in forced CEO turnover, external succession and the market reaction to 
forced CEO turnover announcements. 
  
5. Conclusions  
In this study we analyze the relationship between lender monitoring and CEO succession 
for a sample of large non-financial firms on the FTSE-350 index of the London Stock Exchange.  
Prior research in this area has suggested that banks are special, as relationship lenders who have 
both an informational advantage and the financial incentive to actively monitor borrower firms.   
This study contributes to empirical research on bank monitoring by studying two highly 
visible outcomes of such monitoring; the decision to remove a poorly performing CEO and their 
replacement with an external successor.  Bank involvement in such decisions is hinted at or 
explicitly reported in news coverage of CEO succession, but to the best of our knowledge a 
direct comparison of bank monitoring relative to monitoring by public bondholders has not 
previously been carried out. 
Our findings show that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is increasing with bank 
leverage on the firm’s balance sheet, but is unrelated to public leverage.  We find a stronger 
relation between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt 
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during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt.  Sample firms are also 
more likely to appoint a new CEO from outside the firm when they have announced a bank debt 
issue.  We find no relation between CEO succession and monitoring from public debtholders.  
Lastly, the stock price response to forced CEO succession announcements is higher when firms 
have borrowed from banks during the financial year of CEO turnover. 
As such, our findings complement research that indirectly supports a monitoring role for 
bank debt by providing evidence on the relative efficiency of banks as monitors of borrower 
firms.  Our study also contributes to corporate governance research on the importance and 
effectiveness of lender monitoring.  Our finding that banks are more effective monitors than 
dispersed public bondholders suggests debt should not be treated as a single variable.  In the 
same way that large stockholders and non-executive directors are frequently categorized by 
expected monitoring strength and independence from executive management, our findings 
suggest that bank debt should be separated from public bonds when studying the role of lenders 
in corporate governance. 
Our findings also suggest some avenues for future research.  We argue that banks play an 
important monitoring role in UK firms given the comparatively weaker reliance on public bond 
markets in the UK relative to US capital markets.  Analyzing the importance of lender 
monitoring in US firms where public debt plays a stronger role in corporate financing, or 
international comparisons with bank based economies such as Germany and Japan may provide 
further evidence on the importance of lender monitoring based on a country’s financial system.   
Understanding why poorly performing CEOs choose to borrow from banks represents a 
fruitful area for further research.  Consistent with Franks et al. (2001) for seasoned equity offers, 
our study implies that firms are forced to borrow from banks to restructure their finances, and 
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banks are able to remove a poorly performing CEO in exchange for new funding.  Banks can 
hold power to force the firm into bankruptcy proceedings and/or can pressure the board of 
directors to dismiss poorly performing CEOs in exchange for renewed financing.  Zwiebel’s 
(1996) managerial entrenchment model of capital structure, where managers use debt to reduce 
external control threats, may offer some insight for future research in this area. 
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Table 1 
Description of variables  
Variable Description Source 
Panel A: Firm and performance characteristics 
ASSETS Real book value of total assets expressed in 2000 £millions Datastream 
LEVERAGE The ratio of book value of total debt divided by book value total 
assets 
Datastream 
ΔIROA The annual change in the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by book value of 
total assets minus the same ratio for the median Datastream firm in 
the same FTSE level three industry group as the sample firm 
Datastream 
LOW IC A dummy variable set equal to minus one if the firm has an interest 
coverage ratio of less than 0.8 and zero otherwise.  Interest 
coverage is calculated as EBITDA divided by interest expense.  
Firms with no debt outstanding are coded as zero 
Datastream 
   
Panel B: CEO and board characteristics  
TURNOVER A dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO leaves their position 
and zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
FORCED A dummy variable set equal to one if the CEO is forced from office 
and zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
OUTSIDE A dummy variable set equal to one if the new CEO is appointed 
from outside the company and zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
FOUNDER A dummy variable set equal to one if the current CEO is associated 
with the founding of the firm and zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
BOARD The number of directors on the firm’s board Annual reports 
FRACTION NED The number of non-executive directors divided by the total number 
of directors on the firm’s board 
Annual reports 
BANK AFFILIATED A dummy variable set equal to one if the firm has a bank affiliated 
director on the board, and zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
  
Panel C: Debt ownership characteristics 
PUBLIC LEVERAGE The ratio of book value of total public bonds divided by book value 
of total assets 
Annual reports 
and Datastream 
BANK LEVERAGE The ratio of book value of total bank debt divided by book value of 
total assets.  Only private debt explicitly described as bank 
borrowings is classified as bank debt 
Annual reports 
and Datastream 
PUBLIC ISSUE A dummy variable set equal to one if the firm issues public bonds 
and zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
BANK ISSUE A dummy variable set equal to one if the firm issues bank debt and 
zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
PUBLIC ONLY A dummy variable set equal to one if the firm issue public bonds 
and borrows from no other source during its financial year , and 
zero otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
BANK ONLY A dummy variable set equal to one if the firm borrows from a  bank 
lender and no other source during its financial year and zero 
otherwise 
Annual reports 
and Nexis UK 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for sample firms 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
No. firm 
years 
Mean Median St. Dev Maximum Minimum 
ASSETS 2,095 2,619 668 9,462 169,964 11 
LEVERAGE 2,095 0.2368 0.2059 0.2952 8.4853 0.0000 
PUBLIC RATIO 2,095 0.2002 0.0000 0.3254 1.0000 0.0000 
BANK RATIO 2,095 0.6363 0.7944 0.3856 1.0000 0.0000 
PUBLIC LEVERAGE 2,095 0.0537 0.0000 0.1165 1.1193 0.0000 
BANK LEVERAGE 2,095 0.1358 0.0833 0.1732 3.7733 0.0000 
BOARD 2,076 9.0270 9.0000 2.5322 21.0000 4.0000 
FRACTION NED 2,076 0.5587 0.5714 0.1358 0.8889 0.0000 
BANK AFFILIATED 2,076 0.2464 - - - - 
    
Panel B: CEO turnover variables No. firm years 
Number of events / firm 
years 
Turnover rate 
TURNOVER 2,035 308 0.1514 
FORCED 2,035 87 0.0428 
OUTSIDE 302 121 0.4007 
FOUNDER 2,110 373 0.1768 
    
Panel C: Debt issuance variables No. firm years Number of events Issuance rate 
PUBLIC ISSUE 2,105 255 0.1211 
PUBLIC ONLY 2,105 134 0.0637 
BANK ISSUE 2,105 453 0.2152 
BANK ONLY 2,105 342 0.1626 
PRIVATE ISSUE 2,105 541 0.2570 
PRIVATE ONLY 2,105 420 0.1995 
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of non-financial FTSE-350 firms over the time period 2000-
2008.  PUBLIC RATIO and BANK RATIO are the ratios of balance sheet debt from public and bank sources to 
total debt respectively.  BOARD is defined as the number of directors on the firm’s board.  Data on the source of the 
firm’s debt is collected from the footnotes to annual reports.  Note that there are six cases of CEO turnover where 
the firm is delisted before a replacement CEO is appointed, which results in 302 useable CEO succession events.  
All remaining variables are defined in Table 1.   
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Table 3 
Pairwise correlations amongst independent variables 
 ASSETS ΔIROA LOW IC FOUNDER FRACTION 
NED 
PUBLIC 
LEVERAGE 
BANK 
LEVERAGE 
PUBLIC 
ISSUE 
BANK 
ISSUE 
PUBLIC 
ONLY 
BANK 
ONLY 
BANK 
AFFILIATED 
ASSETS 1.0000            
ΔIROA -0.0215 
(0.0000) 
1.0000           
LOW IC 0.0035 
(0.8740) 
0.2003 
(0.0000) 
1.0000          
FOUNDER -0.1960 
(0.0000) 
-0.0035 
(0.8732) 
0.0279 
(0.2030) 
1.0000         
FRACTION 
NED 
0.2334 
(0.0000) 
0.0164 
(0.4595) 
-0.0849 
(0.0001) 
-0.1862 
(0.0000) 
1.0000        
PUBLIC 
LEVERAGE 
0.3930 
(0.0000) 
-0.0127 
(0.5640) 
-0.0264 
(0.2298) 
-0.0620 
(0.0045) 
0.1151 
(0.0000) 
1.0000       
BANK 
LEVERAGE 
-0.0699 
(0.0014) 
-0.0476 
(0.0306) 
-0.0041 
(0.8535) 
-0.0138 
(0.5269) 
0.0161 
(0.4633) 
-0.1057 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
PUBLIC 
ISSUE 
0.4105 
(0.0000) 
-0.0185 
(0.3991) 
0.0115 
(0.6003) 
-0.0418 
(0.0551) 
0.0845 
(0.0001) 
0.2384 
(0.0000) 
-0.0024 
(0.9144) 
1.0000     
BANK ISSUE 0.1971 
(0.0000) 
0.0104 
(0.6350) 
0.0113 
(0.6054) 
-0.0602 
(0.0057) 
0.0350 
(0.1102) 
0.0947 
(0.0000) 
0.0548 
(0.0121) 
0.1103 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
PUBLIC 
ONLY 
0.2956 
(0.0000) 
-0.0071 
(0.7479) 
0.0088 
(0.6876) 
-0.0129 
(0.5557) 
0.0696 
(0.0015) 
0.1840 
(0.0000) 
-0.0131 
(0.5489) 
0.7023 
(0.0000) 
-0.1367 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
BANK ONLY 0.0677 
(0.0019) 
0.0134 
(0.5423) 
0.0031 
(0.8877) 
-0.0339 
(0.1201) 
0.0161 
(0.4622) 
0.0492 
(0.0244) 
0.0477 
(0.0290) 
-0.1637 
(0.0000) 
0.8411 
(0.0000) 
-0.1150 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
BANK 
AFFILIATED 
0.3175 
(0.0000) 
-0.0070 
(0.7506) 
-0.0022 
(0.9191) 
-0.1295 
(0.0000) 
0.0871 
(0.0001) 
0.1928 
(0.0000) 
-0.0467 
(0.0325) 
0.1320 
(0.0000) 
0.0760 
(0.0005) 
0.0790 
(0.0003) 
0.0409 
(0.0608) 
1.0000 
This table reports pairwise correlations for explanatory variables in our subsequent regression analysis.  The sample covers non-financial FTSE-350 firms over 
the time period 2000-2008.  P-values are reported in parenthesis.  All variables are defined in Table 1.   
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Table 4 
Probit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm performance and borrowing source 
 ΔIROA LOW IC 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LN_ASSETS 
0.0020 
(0.0461) 
[0.0001] 
0.0112 
(0.0438) 
[0.0008] 
-0.0102 
(0.0449) 
[-0.0007] 
0.0026 
(0.0429) 
[0.0002] 
FOUNDER 
-0.5767 
(0.1855)
***
 
[-0.0302] 
-0.5699 
(0.1848)
*** 
[-0.0298] 
-0.5238 
(0.1778)
*** 
[-0.0269] 
-0.5128 
(0.1774)
*** 
[-0.0262] 
PERFORM 
-0.9801  
(0.3025)
***
 
[-0.0709] 
-0.9864 
(0.3003)
*** 
[-0.0711] 
-0.7492 
(0.1487)
*** 
[-0.0519] 
-0.6749 
(0.1458)
*** 
[-0.0463] 
PUBLIC LEVERAGE 
0.4299 
(0.4564) 
[0.0311] 
0.4328 
(0.4573) 
[0.0312] 
0.3427 
(0.4582) 
[0.0237] 
0.3911 
(0.4550) 
[0.0268] 
BANK LEVERAGE 
0.3726 
(0.1913)
* 
[0.0270] 
0.3965 
(0.1895)
** 
[0.0286] 
0.4137 
(0.1923)
**
 
[0.0287] 
0.4187 
(0.1917)
**
 
[0.0287] 
BANK AFFILIATE  
-0.1496 
(0.1285) 
[-0.0101] 
-0.1437 
(0.1277) 
[-0.0096] 
-0.1497 
(0.1308) 
[-0.0096] 
-.01477 
(0.1306) 
[-0.0094] 
PUBLIC ISSUE 
0.1802 
(0.1700) 
[0.0148] 
 
0.2859 
(0.1746) 
[0.0243] 
 
BANK ISSUE 
-0.0709 
(0.1310) 
[-0.0049] 
 
-0.1579 
(0.1512) 
[-0.0101] 
 
PUBLIC ONLY  
0.1549 
(0.2024) 
[0.0126] 
 
0.1210 
(0.2236) 
[0.0092] 
BANK ONLY  
-0.1488 
(0.1561) 
[-0.0098] 
 
-0.3794 
(0.1959)
*
 
[-0.0206] 
PUBLIC ISSUE x 
PERFORM 
-1.5367 
(1.1092) 
[-0.1112] 
 
0.4514 
(0.3775) 
[0.0313] 
 
BANK ISSUE x 
PERFORM 
-2.6985 
(1.0395)
***
 
[-0.1953] 
 
-0.4083 
(0.2802) 
[-0.0283] 
 
PUBLIC ONLY x 
PERFORM 
 
-2.8819 
(1.3067)
**
 
[-0.2078] 
 
0.0761 
(0.4891) 
[0.0052] 
BANK ONLY x 
PERFORM 
 
-2.9368 
(1.1596)
**
 
[-0.2117] 
 
-0.7113 
(0.3182)
** 
[-0.0487] 
Intercept 
-2.0730 
(0.9122)
**
 
-2.2548 
(0.8704)
***
 
-1.9821 
(0.9060)
**
 
-2.2159 
(0.8691)
**
 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR statistic 70.63
***
 74.54
***
 90.46
***
 94.14
***
 
Pseudo R
2 
0.0857 0.0870 0.1069 0.1087 
No. Observations 1,994 1,994 2,002 2,002 
This table reports coefficients and marginal effects from a probit model of the determinants of forced CEO turnover.  
Our sample is drawn from non-financial FTSE-350 firms over the time period 2000 to 2008.  In all specifications the 
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dependent variable is FORCED.  PERFORM is firm performance measured using ΔIROA and LOW IC as specified.  
All remaining variables are defined in Table 1.  The marginal effect of a regressor is given as the derivative of the 
probability of turnover with respect to an individual regressor and is calculated at the mean value of all continuous 
variables.  For dummy variables, the marginal effect represents a discrete change in the dummy variable from zero 
to one.  Marginal effects are reported in brackets.  Robust standard errors for the regression coefficients are reported 
in parenthesis.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote the parameters are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
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Table 5 
Probit regressions of external CEO succession on firm performance and borrowing source 
 ΔIROA LOW IC 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LN_ASSETS 
0.0724 
(0.0725) 
[0.0278] 
0.0883 
(0.0707) 
[0.0340] 
0.0743 
(0.0737) 
[0.0286] 
0.0907 
(0.0717) 
[0.0349] 
FORCED 
0.8133 
(0.1954)
***
 
[0.3145] 
0.8221 
(0.1941)
***
 
[0.3179] 
0.8834 
(0.1992)
***
 
[0.3405] 
0.8880 
(0.1979)
***
 
[0.3422] 
FRACTION NED 
2.4147 
(0.6565)
***
 
[0.9280] 
2.2599 
(0.6513)
***
 
[0.8693] 
2.2959 
(0.6554)
***
 
[0.8838] 
2.1577 
(0.6510)
***
 
[0.8313] 
PERFORM 
-1.0289 
(0.5551)
*
 
[-0.3954] 
-0.9352 
(0.5362)
*
 
[-0.3597] 
-0.1039 
(0.2386) 
[-0.0400] 
-0.0888 
(0.2332) 
[-0.0342] 
PUBLIC LEVERAGE 
-0.6474 
(0.7779) 
[-0.2488] 
-0.7191 
(0.7764) 
[-0.2766] 
-0.8854 
(0.8075) 
[-0.3408] 
-0.9322 
(0.7959) 
[-0.3591] 
BANK LEVERAGE 
-0.7209 
(0.6049) 
[-0.2771] 
-0.7143 
(0.6047) 
[-0.2748] 
-0.6491 
(0.5972) 
[-0.2499] 
-0.6500 
(0.5973) 
[-0.2504] 
BANK AFFILIATE 
-0.0388 
(0.1984) 
[-0.0149] 
-0.0353 
(0.1961) 
[-0.0136] 
0.0006 
(0.1973) 
[0.0002] 
0.0028 
(0.1951) 
[0.0011] 
PUBLIC ISSUE 
-0.3523 
(0.2502) 
[-0.1291] 
 
-0.3428 
(0.2506) 
[-0.1261] 
 
BANK ISSUE 
0.6859 
(0.1977)
***
 
[0.2675] 
 
0.6687 
(0.1952)
***
 
[0.2610] 
 
PUBLIC ONLY  
-0.3902 
(0.3279) 
[-0.1408] 
 
-0.3939 
(0.3274) 
[-0.1423] 
BANK ONLY  
0.4757 
(0.2123)
**
 
[0.1868] 
 
0.4656 
(0.2102)
** 
[0.1829] 
Intercept 
-2.9465 
(1.4845)
**
 
-3.1676 
(1.4634)
**
 
-2.9606 
(1.4994)
**
 
-3.1963 
(1.4744)
**
 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR statistic 70.19*** 60.69*** 68.30*** 59.21*** 
Pseudo R
2 
0.1546 0.1377 0.1532 0.1372 
No. Observations 291 291 292 292 
This table reports marginal effects from a probit model of the determinants of external CEO succession.  Our sample 
is drawn from non-financial FTSE-350 firms over the time period 2000 to 2008.  In all specifications the dependent 
variable is OUTSIDE.  PERFORM is firm performance measured using ΔIROA and LOW IC as specified.  All 
remaining variables are defined in Table 1.  The marginal effect of a regressor is given as the derivative of the 
probability of turnover with respect to an individual regressor and is calculated at the mean value of all continuous 
variables.  For dummy variables, the marginal effect represents a discrete change in the dummy variable from zero 
to one.  Marginal effects are reported in brackets.  Robust standard errors for the regression coefficients are reported 
in parenthesis.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote the parameters are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
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Table 6 
Event study cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) on announcement of CEO turnover 
Type of turnover Number of announcements -1 to +1 
TURNOVER 302 
-0.0134 
(-5.2844)
***
 
FORCED 87 
-0.0452 
(-7.6091)
***
 
VOLUNTARY 215 
-0.0005 
(-0.1858) 
OUTSIDE 120 
-0.0093 
(-2.0494)
**
 
INSIDE 182 
-0.0160 
(-4.7584)
***
 
TURNOVER and PUBLIC ISSUE 40 
-0.0041 
(-0.7289) 
TURNOVER and BANK ISSUE 65 
0.0126 
(2.3392)
**
 
TURNOVER and PUBLIC ONLY 21 
-0.0010 
(-0.1364) 
TURNOVER and BANK ONLY 51 
0.0111 
(1.6888)
*
 
FORCED and PUBLIC ISSUE 13 
-0.0013 
(-0.1180) 
FORCED and BANK ISSUE 20 
0.0578 
(4.5115)
***
 
FORCED and PUBLIC ONLY 7 
0.0025 
(0.1681) 
FORCED and BANK ONLY 14 
0.0631 
(3.6978)
***
 
OUTSIDE and PUBLIC ISSUE 14 
0.0.118 
(1.2299) 
OUTSIDE and BANK ISSUE 37 
0.0243 
(3.2254)
***
 
OUTSIDE and PUBLIC ONLY 7 
0.0101 
(0.6954) 
OUTSIDE and BANK ONLY 27 
0.0254 
(2.6274)
**
 
The table reports market model cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) on announcements of CEO turnover.  
Market model parameters are estimated over the trading period -200 to -31 relative to the event date.  The three-day 
event window (-1, +1) is measured relative to the first announcement day, 0.  The FTSE-350 Index is used as the 
market benchmark for estimating CAARs.  CEO turnover and debt issuance sub-samples are categorized based on 
CEO turnover and debt issuance occurring during the same financial year.  VOLUNTARY are all non-forced CEO 
turnover events and inside are all CEO turnover events where an internal successor is appointed to replace the 
outgoing CEO.  All remaining variables are defined in Table 1.  Two-tailed student’s t-tests are reported in 
parenthesis.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote the test statistics are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
  
44 
 
Table 7 
Ordinary least squares regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on announcement of CEO 
turnover 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LN_ASSETS 
0.0042 
(0.0042) 
0.0050 
(0.0042) 
0.0038 
(0.0042) 
0.0039 
(0.0042) 
FORCED 
-0.0977 
(0.0246)
***
 
-0.0702 
(0.0215)
***
 
-0.0959 
(0.0247)
***
 
-0.0926 
(0.0241)
***
 
OUTSIDE 
0.0214 
(0.0140) 
0.0071 
(0.0160) 
0.0136 
(0.0161) 
0.0187 
(0.0157) 
PUBLIC LEVERAGE 
0.0408 
(0.0447) 
0.0236 
(0.0445) 
0.0448 
(0.0451) 
0.0449 
(0.0462) 
BANK LEVERAGE 
-0.0197 
(0.0379) 
-0.0138 
(0.0386) 
-0.0166 
(0.0385) 
-0.0198 
(0.0387) 
BANK AFFILIATE 
0.0011 
(0.0141) 
-0.0017 
(0.0148) 
0.0001 
(0.0143) 
0.0017 
(0.0144) 
PUBLIC ISSUE 
-0.0130 
(0.0168) 
-0.0162 
(0.0224) 
-0.0200 
(0.0186) 
 
BANK ISSUE 
-0.0152 
(0.0126) 
-0.0094 
(0.0169) 
-0.0243 
(0.0185) 
 
PUBLIC ONLY    
-0.0116 
(0.0197) 
BANK ONLY    
-0.0211 
(0.0201) 
PUBLIC ISSUE x FORCED 
0.0271 
(0.0467) 
 
0.0116 
(0.0618) 
 
BANK ISSUE x FORCED 
0.1256 
(0.0421)
***
 
 
0.1176 
(0.0416)
***
 
 
PUBLIC ONLY x FORCED    
0.0661 
(0.0721) 
BANK ONLY x FORCED    
0.1318 
(0.0581)
**
 
PUBLIC ISSUE x OUTSIDE  
0.0448 
(0.0361) 
0.0346 
(0.0516) 
 
BANK ISSUE x OUTSIDE  
0.0561 
(0.0338)
*
 
0.0206 
(0.0322) 
 
PUBLIC ONLY x OUTSIDE    
0.0239 
(0.0589) 
BANK ONLY x OUTSIDE    
0.0162 
(0.0336) 
Intercept 
-0.0863 
(0.0854) 
-0.1051 
(0.0873) 
-0.0768 
(0.0854) 
-0.0783 
(0.0858) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 1.60
**
 1.52
*
 1.47
*
 1.53
*
 
Adjusted R
2 
0.2151 0.1873 0.2183 0.2127 
No. Observations 295 295 295 295 
The table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of announcement period cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) on announcements of CEO turnover.  Market model parameters are estimated over the trading period 
-200 to -31 relative to the event date.  The three-day event window (-1, +1) is measured relative to the first 
announcement day, 0.  The FTSE-350 Index is used as the market benchmark for estimating CAARs.  CEO turnover 
and debt issuance sub-samples are categorized based on CEO turnover and debt issuance occurring during the same 
financial year.  All variables are defined in Table 1.  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 
denote the parameters are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
 
 
